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ABSTRACT: The literature shows that a lender becomes reluctant to aid a distressed client after
it receives insurance on its outstanding debt via a credit default swap (CDS). The onset of CDS
trade thus accelerates client bankruptcy. We predict that the client firm’s shareholders would
respond by demanding improved corporate governance and financial reporting quality to protect
their interests. We find an increase in independence of the board of directors and a decline in the
dual position of chief executive office and board chairman following the onset of CDS trading.
We also find higher earnings response coefficient and trading volumes around the earnings
announcement dates and lower post–earnings announcement drift. Overall, our results are
consistent with the idea that shareholders demand higher quality of, or pay greater attention to,
financial reports following the onset of CDS trading.

JEL Classifications: G32, G33; M41; M48
Keywords: Credit default swap; Agency conflict; Corporate governance; Financial reporting
quality; bankruptcy
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The onset of trading of credit default swap (CDS) on a reference firm’s outstanding loan
provides the firm’s lender an opportunity to buy insurance on the firm’s credit risk. The borrowerlender relationship, originally formed based on the expectation of renegotiation and
accommodation in times of borrower distress (Roberts and Sufi 2009), changes significantly after
the lender buys CDS–based insurance. The “empty” lender continues to have the legal rights
attached to the lending arrangement but has reduced interest in the efficient continuation of the
borrower (Hu and Black, 2008; Bolton and Oehmke, 2011). It may refuse to renegotiate with, and
to accommodate the needs of, a financially distressed client. The resultant lender intransigence
increases the likelihood of borrower bankruptcy (Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang, 2014; Danis,
2016). In sum, the onset of CDS trade on a firm’s outstanding debt (CDS inception) is beyond its
shareholders’ control, but exacerbates the likelihood of their value loss relative to lenders whose
loans are partially or fully insured by CDS contracts.
The extant literature claims that financial reports mandated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and corporate governance are the primary devices by which shareholder
protect their interests (Berle and Means 1933; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Watts and Zimmerman
1978, 1983; Ball 2001). Motivated by this literature, we hypothesize that the outside shareholders
of the reference firm would respond to CDS inception by taking two actions. First, they would
demand stronger corporate governance. Second, they would pay greater attention to the firm’s
financial performance and seek improved quality of financial reports. We find evidence supporting
these two hypotheses. We contribute to the literature by showing enhanced shareholder interest in
firm affairs and reallocation of control rights to shareholders vis-à-vis managers and lenders in
years following CDS inception (Aghion and Bolton 1992; Kim, Shroff, Vyas, Wittengerg1
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Moerman 2017). We respond to Stulz (2010, 18), who claims that “there is a dearth of serious
empirical studies” on the implications of CDS, and to Augustin, Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang
(2014), who call for a thorough examination of changes in borrowers’ activities upon CDS
inception.
The onset of CDS trading could be harmful to shareholder interests in two ways. First,
lender intransigence after the onset of CDS trading exacerbates the borrower bankruptcy risk
(Subrahmanyam et al. 2014). Firms enter into debt contracts with the anticipation of future
accommodation by and renegotiation with lenders. Over 90% of corporate long-term loans are
renegotiated before maturity when the borrower faces adverse developments (Roberts and Sufi
2009). After purchasing insurance via a CDS contract on the outstanding loans of its client, the
empty lender does not derive the same benefit from the client’s efficient continuation as before
(Morrison 2005; Arentsen, Mauer, Rosenlund, Zhang, and Zhao 2015; Martin and Roychowdhuy
2015). The resulting lender intransigence increases the likelihood of borrower bankruptcy
(Subrahmanyam et al. 2014). At an extreme, a lender holding a CDS might strategically encourage
the borrower to default on its loan obligations to receive a more handsome insurance payment
(Pollack 2013).1 Second, the lender reduces its monitoring efforts and imposes lesser discipline
upon a borrower in the event of a covenant violation (Chakraborty, Chava, and Ganduri 2015). 2
The weakened lender monitoring and oversight might increase managerial opportunism (Diamond
1984; Besanko and Kanatas 1993; Ahn and Choi 2009; Kim and Zhang 2016).

See https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-11-17/blackstone-may-do-its-cleverest-cds-trade-again (last
access Dec 22, 2017). Blackstone Group LP’s GSO Capital Partners credit fund, which owned a CDS on distressed
Spanish gaming company Codere SA, forced Codere to miss an interest payment on its bonds to trigger default.
2 In addition, the lender’s asset is now assigned the risk of the CDS guarantor instead of that of the borrower (Basel
II, page 49, Article 141). The resultant change of the counterparty risk from borrower to CDS writer reduces the
lender’s regulatory capital requirement, allowing it to expand its loan portfolio (Shan, Tang, and Yan 2014). Such a
portfolio expansion further dilutes the lender’s monitoring effort per client.
1

2
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The weakened monitoring by lenders can benefit shareholders if the borrowing firm can
take actions that improve shareholder wealth, which were previously constrained by lender
monitoring. For example, the borrower can implement risky but positive net present value projects
that increase shareholder value but exacerbate the lender’s downside risk (Campello and Matta
2012). The onset of CDS trading, thus, could increase both the downside investment risk and the
upside potential for outside shareholders of the reference entity. Those shareholders must enhance
their interest in firm affairs post–CDS inception to protect their interests (e.g., Kim et al. 2017).
We test this hypothesis by examining two avenues available to outside shareholders: (1) demand
improved corporate governance and (2) pay greater attention to, and insist on improved quality of,
financial reporting.
We first examine changes in the structure of the board of directors following CDS
inception. Thousands of dispersed shareholders are unable to control or monitor corporate business
decisions (Bainbridge 2006). Shareholders collectively appoint directors to the board and empower
them to make decisions on their behalf with respect to the corporation’s significant actions and
transactions (Berle and Means 1932). Independent directors are more likely to protect shareholder
interests than are directors who are managers of the company.3 Shareholders, therefore, respond
to crisis situations by appointing more independent directors to the board (Gordon 2007). So, we
hypothesize that shareholders would demand an increase in board independence post–CDS
inception. The effectiveness of board independence, however, is compromised when the chief
executive officer (CEO) also holds the position of board chairman (Jensen 1993; Goyal and Park
(2002). Hence, we expect that shareholders would demand a reduction in CEO-chairman duality

See, for example, Weisbach (1988), Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009),
Beasley (1996), Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996), Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and Lapides (2000), and
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008).
3

3
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post–CDS inception. We find results consistent with our expectations.
We also hypothesize that post–CDS inception, outside investors would also demand higher
quality financial reports (those that more accurately reflect the underlying firm performance in the
current period) and that they would pay greater attention to financial reports. We complement prior
literature which shows that management guidance and analyst forecasts become more informative
after CDS inception. Kim et al. (2017) show that shareholders demand and managers respond by
providing more frequent earnings guidance following the onset of CDS trading. And Batta et al.
(2016) find that equity analysts use additional information generated from CDS market trades to
improve their earnings forecast accuracy. Despite the existence of equity analysts’ reports and
managers’ voluntary earnings guidance, SEC-mandated financial reports remain an important
source of value-relevant information for outside investors (Beyer et al. 2010).
We test our hypothesis by examining changes in shareholder reaction to the firm’s earnings
announcements in the years following the onset of its CDS trading. We find increases in earnings
response coefficient (Ball and Brown 1967; Holthausen and Verrecchia 1988; Liu and Thomas
2000) and trading volume on earnings announcement dates (Beaver 1968). We also observe a
decline in post–earnings announcement drift (PEAD), which suggests that equity investors
underreact less to value-relevant information contained in earnings (e.g., Hirshleifer, Lim, and
Teoh 2009). In addition, the estimation errors of working capital accruals decline (Dechow and
Dichev 2002). These developments show heightened shareholder attention to, or improved quality
of, earnings reports in the years following CDS inception.
We conduct cross-sectional tests to identify contexts in which the improvement in
corporate governance and earnings quality are stronger post CDS inception. We find that our main
results are stronger or hold only for firms that do not provide earnings guidance. In this respect,
4
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we extend Kim et al. (2017). We demonstrate that the post–CDS inception improvement in
mandated financial reports and shareholder control mechanisms occurs mainly when valuerelevant information is not more forthcoming from managers on a voluntary basis. To strengthen
our identification strategy with respect to reduced lender interest, we isolate banks that likely
hedged their exposure upon CDS inception (Minton, Stulz, and Williamson 2009; Subrahmanyam
et al. 2014). Our results are stronger for the subsample of borrowers associated with such lenders.
In addition, we find stronger results for syndicated loans than for solo lenders. The coordination
issues and agency problems among the consortium members and the reduction in lender
monitoring post CDS inception is expected to be more severe in the former than in the latter cases
(Preecea and Mullineaux 1996; Ivashina 2009; Amiram, Beaver, Landsman, and Zhao, 2017). We
also find stronger results when loans carry fewer financial covenants because loan covenants are
the main device of lender monitoring (Dichev and Skinner 2002; Kim et al. 2017). Finally, we find
stronger effects when the borrower displays greater financial distress.4
Overall, our results indicate that financial reporting quality improves post–CDS inception.
However, that inference runs contrary to Martin and Roychowdhuy (2015), who show a decline in
accounting conservatism post–CDS inception. Martin and Roychowdhuy (2015) argue that this
change in financial reporting attribute stems from the empty lenders’ reduced interest in protecting
their downside risk and enforcing the debt covenants (LaFond and Watts 2008). The contrasting
shifts in proxies of financial reporting quality our paper and Martin and Roychowdhuy (2015)
find—a decline in accounting conservatism but an improvement in value relevance—can be

A lender’s reputation is diminished when a borrower defaults, because the default could be attributed to poor lender
monitoring. However, this reputational loss is lower when a highly distressed borrower defaults, because the default
cannot be attributed to poor lender monitoring (Gopalan, Nanda, and Yerramilli 2011; Kim et al. 2017). Thus, a lender
has lower reputation fallouts to be concerned about in reducing its monitoring or aiding a highly distressed borrower.
4

5
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explained by the notion that financial statements support a wide range of decisions for different
stakeholders. Hence, the quality of financial statements is best assessed by evaluating their
usefulness in specific decision contexts of those stakeholders (Ball 2001; Holthausen and Watts
2001; Dechow, Ge, and Schrand 2010). Our results indicate a post–CDS inception shift in
attributes of financial reporting toward the demands of shareholders, and away from the demands
of lenders, reflecting the heightened and diminished interests in firm affairs of the two
stakeholders, respectively.
Even though a third party initiates the CDS trading, the timing of the inception of CDS
trading may not be a random event and could be associated with simultaneous changes in corporate
governance and earnings quality. We address the potential endogeneity problems related to CDS
inception, particularly omitted factors that determine the demand for and supply of CDS contracts
(Ashcraft and Santos 2009), by conducting all our tests using a difference-in-differences approach
relative to non-CDS firms. [Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), Martin and Roychowdhury (2015), Batta
et al. (2016), and Kim et al. (2017) use a similar approach.] In addition, we use a Heckman twostage procedure to control for selection bias (Martin and Roychowdhury 2015).
Our paper contributes to two streams of literature. The first examines a range of economic
consequences of CDS inception, including improved analyst earnings forecasts (Batta et al. 2016),
higher bankruptcy risk (Subrahmanyam et al. 2014), more conservative cash holding policies
(Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang 2017), less conservative financial reporting (Martin and
Roychowdhury 2015), and enhanced managerial disclosures (Kim et al. 2017). We add to this
literature by showing changes in the structure of boards of directors and equity shareholders’
interest in financial reports post–CDS inception. Our results support the premise in Kim et al.
(2017) that shareholders step up their monitoring of firm affairs after the start of CDS trades. Our
6
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findings are consistent with the reallocation of control rights toward shareholder interest post–
CDS inception (Aghion and Bolton 1992).
The second stream of literature we contribute to examines the properties of financial
reports. We identify a unique event that contrastingly affects the proxies of earnings quality. These
proxies change in a direction consistent with their improvement from the equity investors’
valuation perspective, but they decline from the lenders’ perspective (Martin and Rowchowdhury
2015). We support the assertion in Dechow et al. (2010) that all proxies of earnings quality need
not be in sync with each other. That they could even move in opposite directions depending on the
shifts in demands from different stakeholders.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews prior literature and develops
the main hypotheses. Section III discusses the research design, sample selection, and measurement
of variables. Section IV presents the empirical results. Section V describes robustness tests, and
Section VI concludes the paper.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND MOTIVATION OF HYPOTHESES
In this section, we review prior literature and formulate hypotheses.
Prior Literature
CDSs were initially created to hedge the credit risk of bank loans. After the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) standardized CDS contracts, new CDS writers with no
direct association with the underlying firm, such as hedge funds and asset managers, entered the
CDS market. The notional amount of outstanding CDS contracts peaked at $62.2 trillion by the
end of 2007. After the financial crisis of 2008–2009, the notional amount declined, but it remains
at the double-digit trillion-dollar level.

7
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A CDS buyer purchases insurance against a credit event of an underlying reference entity
by paying an annuity premium to the protection seller (Augustin et al. 2014). A credit event is an
occurrence that adversely affects the reference entity’s creditworthiness, such as a default of
interest or principal payment or a violation of a covenant of a junior or senior debt. The initiation
of CDS trades thus offers the lender an opportunity to change its counterparty risk to the one based
on a more creditworthy CDS writer, even if the CDS is not written on the lender’s original asset.
The lender, being the legal claimant to the original debt, continues to hold the rights associated
with the lending contract despite having purchased the credit risk protection and having reduced
its economic interest in the borrower (Hu and Black 2008; Bolton and Oehmke, 2011). This post–
CDS trade phenomenon is referred to in prior literature as the separation of control rights and cash
flow rights.
Borrowers enter into lending arrangements with an understanding that the lender would
renegotiate the contract in the future if adverse changes in the firm’s environment occur, as is
evident from the renegotiations of a vast majority of corporate long-term debt contracts before
maturity (Roberts and Sufi 2009; Denis and Wang 2014). The lender’s interest in the efficient
continuation of the debtor, however, declines after having obtained insurance (Bolton and Oehmke
2011). The lender becomes less flexible in negotiating with the client upon any credit event and is
less willing to provide additional loans to the borrower to ride out its temporary liquidity problems.
It could even push the borrower into a credit default, inefficient bankruptcy, or liquidation to
collect a more handsome insurance payment. The increased lender intransigence post–CDS
inception thus enhances the likelihood of the reference entity’s bankruptcy, even though the
reference entity plays no role in the creation of CDSs or the inception of their trades
(Subrahmanyam et al. 2014). Stated differently, CDS inception is an event over which the
8
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shareholders of the reference entity have little control, but it increases the likelihood of sudden
decline in share price and loss of shareholder wealth, all else held equal.
Lenders actively monitor client activities to ensure the security of their assets. Furthermore,
lenders enforce their rights in the event of debt covenant violations. Monitoring and contract
enforcement, however, are costly. An empty lender is less likely to monitor clients’ activities and
enforce contractual provisions as much as before (Morrison 2005; Ashcraft and Santos 2009;
Subrahmanyam et al. 2014). In addition, its monitoring efforts would be spread over a larger
number of clients, because its regulatory capital requirement are reduced on account of improved
counterparty risk, allowing it to expansion its loan portfolio (Shan et al. 2014). Such reduced lender
monitoring and laxer enforcement of lender covenants could harm shareholder interest because
lender monitoring improves managerial commitment and reduces managerial opportunism.5
In certain circumstances, lesser lender monitoring could benefit shareholders who own a
European call option on the firm’s assets, with the face value of debt being the strike price.6
Shareholders thus have a strong incentive to increase asset volatility. However, the same increase
in asset volatility increases the downside risk for lenders. Reduced oversight from lenders
following CDS inception could permit the client firm to change its real activities in ways that
benefit company shareholders but were previously constrained by lenders (Campello and Matta
2012). To the extent that rival lender and shareholder forces determine the corporate investment
policy, that equilibrium would shift toward shareholder interests once the lender loses its interests
in monitoring client activities (Jensen and Mecking 1976).

Bank monitoring is useful for other lenders and shareholders because closely monitored loans signal a borrowing
firm’s creditworthiness and lowers the information costs of other agents in the firm (Diamond 1984; Fama 1985; Sufi
2007).
6 They get to keep an increase in firm value beyond the face value of debt, but they do not have to compensate lenders
when the firm value declines below the face value of debt.
5

9

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3094968

Thus, on one hand, CDS inception causes a sudden loss of shareholder wealth with firm
bankruptcy. On the other hand, CDS inception can increase upside potential for firm shareholders
via changes in the firm’s investment policy. Furthermore, insiders can trade on their private
information in CDS markets without having to disclose all of their trades (Batta et al. 2016). In
any of these cases, external investors would be better protect the value of their investments by
taking greater interest in the firm affairs post–CDS inception and enforcing their control and
monitoring rights (Kim et al. 2017). We examine two avenues to achieve this purpose: corporate
governance and financial reporting.
Corporate Governance
The board of directors plays the single most important role in the corporate-governance
system. The thousands of dispersed shareholders of the modern publicly traded corporation are
unable to come together to dictate business decisions. Therefore, they elect a centralized group—
the board of directors—to represent their interests (Berle and Means 1932). Under the corporate
laws of most states, the board is entrusted with the management of the business and affairs of the
corporation (Mourning 2007). State laws typically provide the board with the final legal say on
most of the corporation’s significant decisions and transactions. Ideally, directors, acting as a
board, must keep the interests of the shareholders foremost in their collective mind.
Given that directors work based on their own personal incentives and reputational concerns
(Masulis and Mobbs 2013), shareholders are allowed to elect those who have their trust and
confidence and vote out those who are not responsive to their concerns and requests (DeGaetano
2004). Prior studies show that independent directors better protect shareholder interests than
executive directors, on average. Director independence impacts turnover of poorly performing
CEOs (e.g., Weisbach 1988), executive compensation decisions (e.g., Core et al. 1999;
10
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Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2009), the incidence of fraud (e.g., Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 1996;
Beasley et al. 2000), and the opportunistic timing of stock option grants (e.g., Bebchuk, Cohen,
and Ferrell 2008). Hence, shareholders respond to adverse events by appointing more independent
directors to the board (Gordon 2007). Based on the idea that shareholders would take greater
interest in firm affairs post–CDS inception, we hypothesize that the percentage of independent
directors on the board of a company would increase after the onset of CDS trading. Independent
directors’ efforts to protect shareholder rights are, however, hindered by a CEO who also holds
the position of chairman of the board. Therefore, we also expect a reduction in the frequency of
CEO-chairman duality post–CDS inception.
Theoretical support for our hypothesis comes from the notion that board structure is
determined by the demands of firm stakeholders (Hermalin and Weisbach 1988, 1998, 2003).
Kroszner and Strahan (2001) and Güner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008) find evidence of conflicts
of interest between board directors appointed by creditors and shareholders. Ferreira, Ferreira, and
Mariano (2017) find an increase in bankers’ representation on corporate boards following the
violations in loan covenants. Given that CDS initiation could be followed by reduced lender
interest in monitoring the company, but heightened shareholder interest (Kim et al. 2017), we
expect the opposite of trends documented in Ferreira et al. (2017), that is, a shift in board of
directors towards shareholder interest, all else held equal.
We therefore present H1.
H1: Board independence increases and CEO-chairman declines following the onset of
CDS trading.

11
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Financial reporting quality
External shareholders should pay greater attention to firm affairs post–CDS inception.
Consistent with this idea, Kim et al. (2017) find that shareholders seek, and managers provide,
more frequent voluntary earnings guidance. Despite the existence of managers’ voluntary
disclosures and analysts’ forecasts, SEC-mandated financial reports remain a principal source of
value-relevant information for investors (Beyer et al. 2010). Financial statement information is
also used for managerial contracting and stewardship. We therefore hypothesize that outside
investors would demand improvement in financial reporting quality and would pay greater
attention to firms’ financial reports post–CDS inception.
H2: Investor attention to financial reports increases, and the proxies of decision usefulness
of earnings improve, following the onset of CDS trading.
We test our hypothesis by examining changes in earnings response coefficient (Ball and
Brown 1967; Holthausen and Verrecchia 1988; Liu and Thomas 2000), trading volume on earnings
announcement dates (Beaver 1968), and PEAD (Hirshleifer et al. 2009). In addition, we examine
estimation errors in working capital accruals (Dechow and Dichev 2002). Thus, the empirical
proxies we examine are also considered the measures of financial reporting quality. Our hypothesis
of improvement in financial reporting quality therefore seemingly contradicts prior findings of
post–CDS inception decline in accounting conservatism, which is another proxy for financial
reporting quality (Martin and Roychowdhury 2015). This apparent contradiction is supported in
prior literature based on the multiple facets and uses of financial reports.
Financial statements support a wide range of decisions for different stakeholders.
Therefore, the attributes of financial reporting are shaped by the stakeholders’ demands (Ball
2001). The relative weights of those demands, when they differ, determine the final attributes
12
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(Holthausen and Watts 2001). Lenders place higher weight on accounting conservatism (timelier
recognition of losses than gains) than do shareholders, as lenders stand to lose more from a decline
in firm value than the amount they gain from an increase in firm value (LaFond and Watts 2008).
Conservatism, however, is just one attribute of a firm’s financial reporting system. The Financial
Accounting Standard Board (FASB) conceptual framework stipulates that ﬁnancial statements
should help investors in ‘‘assessing the amounts, timing, and uncertainty’’ of future cash ﬂows
(FASB Concepts No. 1. 1978, p.3). A ﬁrm’s performance, as summarized in its income statement,
is an important factor in investors’ assessment of current-period changes in the present value of
future cash ﬂows (Ou and Penman 1989). Equity investors therefore demand timely reporting of
value-relevant information to identify profitable investment opportunities. For example, equity
investors could demand recording of revenues and assets that signal improvement in future cash
flows, even when their recording violates the tenet of conservative accounting. Furthermore,
shareholders could be better off with the reporting of profits for a firm that is on the verge of debt
default and whose dividend payouts are determined by reported profits. The same dividend
payment would cause wealth transfer from lenders to shareholders.
In sum, the proxies of earnings quality differ by the contexts of decisions made based on
financial statements. They could change based on variation in demands from different stakeholders
in response to the same event (Dechow et al. 2010). H2, therefore, also tests the proposition put
forward by Dechow et al. (2010).

13
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III. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
In this section, we describe the selection of sample and control firms and discuss their key
statistics.
Sample Selection
We collect data from the Markit database, which covers CDS quotes of U.S. firms starting
in 2001. Markit verifies its CDS data through a multistage scrubbing procedure that includes
assessing the legal relation between a reference entity and a reference obligation as well as
corporate actions, CDS succession events, and credit events. We collect financial and stock price
data from Compustat North America and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP),
respectively. We merge the Markit data with information from Compustat North America and
CRSP using the ticker and by cross-validating the match between these data sets based on company
names. We use two separate samples to examine our hypotheses. Testing H1 requires data on
boards of directors that we obtain from Institutional Shareholder Services (formerly RiskMetrics)
and BoardEx. We identify 520 U.S. firms (6,699 firm-years) that initiated trading on single-name
CDS contracts and use 2,202 U.S. firms (14,708 firm-years) as non-CDS firms (control firms)
during the sample period from 1998 to 2014. Our sample period begins in 1998 because the data
coverage of Institutional Shareholder Services starts then. Testing H2 requires data for calculating
proxies for earnings quality and PEAD. We need analyst forecasts from Institutional Brokers’
Estimate System (I/B/E/S), daily stock price and volume data from CRSP, and quarterly and
annual financial variables from Compustat. We identify 610 U.S. firms (13,252 firm-years) that
initiated trading on single-name CDS contracts and use 11,322 U.S. firms (94,203 firm-years) as
non-CDS firms (control firms) during the sample period from 1983 to 2014. Sample selection is
described in Panel A of Table 1.
14
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[Insert Table 1 near here]
Proxies for Corporate Governance
We use two proxies for corporate governance: board independence (BD_INDEP),
measured by the number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors (e.g.,
Guest 2008; Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian 2008; Lobo and Zhao 2013), and Duality, an indicator
variable that takes the value of one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and zero otherwise
(e.g., Boyd 1995; Cornett et al. 2008; Lobo and Zhao 2013).
Proxies for Shareholder Attentiveness and Earnings Quality
We use four proxies for shareholder attentiveness: (1) earnings response coefficient (ERC)
and (2) R-squared (RSQ) from a regression of three-day size-adjusted stock returns on quarterly
earnings announcement dates on changes in earnings, (3) abnormal trading volume on annual
earnings announcement (ABVOL), and (4) post–earnings announcement drift (PEAD). The first
three proxies of shareholder attentiveness are also considered in the literature as measures of
earnings quality. We examine accrual quality (DDAQ) as another measure of earnings quality.
Thus, we have three proxies of earnings quality and four proxies of shareholder attentiveness, with
ERC, RSQ, and PEAD representing both constructs.
Equity valuation uses information from income statements to forecast future revenues,
earnings, and cash flows (Ou and Penman 1989). A long stream of literature going back to Ball
and Brown (1967) considers the association between earnings and stock prices as a measure of
usefulness of earnings from the equity investors’ perspective. Consistent with this idea, Liu and
Thomas (2000) conclude that ERC is a strong proxy for earnings relevance, representing investor
reaction to new information contained in earnings. We estimate a regression of cumulative threeday size-adjusted stock returns on the earnings announcement date on the changes in quarterly
15
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earnings. We estimate the following regression on a firm-year basis using four quarterly
observations:
Retiq = β1 + β2 ×∆Earningsi,q + εi ,

(1)

where Ret is the cumulative three-day size-adjusted stock returns on the quarterly earnings
announcement date (day −1 to 1). ∆Earnings is firm i’s quarterly earnings change, scaled by total
assets. We measure ERC by the coefficient on ΔEarnings (that is, β2). R-squared of equation (1)
(RSQ) is the second proxy of earnings relevance. Both variables are also proxies for investors’
attentiveness to news in earnings.
We consider estimation errors in working capital accruals as a converse measure of
earnings quality (Dechow and Dichev 2002) as modified by McNichols (2002). This proxy is based
on the reasoning that the role of accruals is to mitigate the noise in operating cash flow, which
arises from exogenous or manipulative variation in firms’ working capital levels, and makes the
operating cash flow less useful for predicting firm performance. Working capital accruals, which
incorporate assets such as inventory, prepayments, and accounts receivable and liabilities such as
unearned revenue, warranty provisions, and accounts payable, shift the recording of cash flows to
the adjusted number of earnings making it more useful for representing the firm’s current
performance and for predicting future cash flows. Nevertheless, the recording of accruals requires
estimates about future cash flows, invariably leading to measurement errors. Therefore, estimating
errors in accruals are considered an inverse measure of earnings quality (Dechow and Dichev
2002). We define DDAQ as the standard deviation of three firm-year residuals on a rolling basis,
ending in the measurement year, obtained from the cross-sectional estimation
∆WCt =β0 + β1 ×CFOt-1 + β2 ×CFOt + β3 ×CFOt+1 + β4 ×∆Salest + β5 ×PPEt + εt ,
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(2)

All of the variables are scaled by beginning of year total assets.7 Equation (2) is estimated
cross-sectionally for each industry with at least 20 observations in a given year based on the Fama
and French (1997) 48 industry classification. We drop the observations for the CDSs’ initiation
year and the next year, because their measurement includes the past three years’ values, requiring
data from the pre–CDS inception years. We multiply DDAQ by minus one such that the value of
DDAQ increases with earnings quality.
We measure shareholder attentiveness by the abnormal volume of share trades on the
earnings announcement dates (ABVOL). This measure represents the extent to which investors
perceive earnings to contain value-relevant information, thus resolving or increasing disagreement
among investors about firm value (Beaver 1968). At an extreme, if investors pay no attention to
earnings announcements, then announcement dates would have no abnormal trading volume.
Abnormal trading volume is measured by first subtracting the average of daily volume for the 60
trading days preceding the annual announcement interval from the average of daily volume in the
three-day period around annual earnings announcement (day −1 to 1). Then, the difference is
scaled by the standard deviation of daily volume in the 60 trading days preceding the annual
announcement interval (Landsman and Maydew 2002; Hope, Thomas, and Winterbotham 2009).
Post–earnings announcement drift (PEAD) is our fourth proxy for investors’ attentiveness
to news in earnings. The construct is measured by the positive and significant correlation between
surprises in current quarter’s earnings and subsequent stock returns in the same direction. The
correlation can result from neglect of value-relevant information contained in current-period
∆WC denotes changes in working capital accounts as disclosed on the statement of cash from operations, measured
as the increase in accounts receivable (RECT) plus the increase in inventory (INVT) plus the decrease in accounts
payable and accrued liabilities (APALCH) plus decrease in taxes accrued (TXACH) plus the increase (decrease) in
other assets (liabilities) (UAOLOCH), scaled by beginning total assets. CFO denotes cash from operations in year t
(OANCF). ∆Sales is change in sales (SALE) scaled by beginning total assets (AT), and PPE is property, plant, and
equipment (PPENT) scaled by beginning total assets.
7
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earnings (Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 2011), investors’ underreaction to earnings news arising from
limited attention or other psychological biases (Bernard and Thomas 1989, 1990; Barberis,
Shleifer, and Vishny 1998; Daniel et al. 1998), and limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).
This neglect should decrease because of heightened investors’ interest in and attention to the firm’s
reported performance post–CDS inception. Following prior work, we measure standardized
unexpected earnings (SUE) by the earnings per share from the I/B/E/S Summary file minus the
median of all analyst forecasts on the I/B/E/S Summary file:
SUEi,q =

Ei,q - Avg(E*i,q )
𝑃i,q

,

(3)

where E is actual quarterly earnings per share before extraordinary items for firm i in quarter q,
Avg (E*) is the median analyst forecasts of quarterly earnings per share, and 𝑃i,q is the price per
share for firm i at the end of quarter t from Compustat (see, e.g., Livnat and Mendenhall 2006).
Each observation requires at least two analyst forecasts. We categorize the sample into three
subgroups, contingent upon the size of SUE per calendar quarter. Hedge portfolios are formed
using tertile classifications based on the magnitude of SUE. Subsequent stock returns (POSTRET)
are accumulated over the three months after the portfolio formation date (from +2 to +64 trading
days following the announcement date). The hedge portfolios are formed by taking a long position
in the top tertile firms and a short position in the bottom tertile firms. Hedged returns are calculated
separately for CDS and non-CDS firms.
Sample Distribution
The samples of firms we examine differ for each hypothesis test because of variations in
data requirements, as presented in Panel A of Table 1. For brevity, we report in Panel B the sample
distribution by year for testing just one aspect of H2 that yields the highest number of observations
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(that is, 12,769 for CDS firms and 91,023 for non-CDS firms). The first (last) two columns report
the distribution for CDS firms (non-CDS firms). The number of observations monotonically
increases over the sample period for both CDS firms and non-CDS firms. Table 2 reports the
sample distribution by industry, which is based on the Campbell (1987) industry classifier. Our
sample covers a range of industries, the most heavily represented being Basic industry for CDS
firms (16.09%) and Consumer durables industry for non-CDS firms (16.01%), followed by
Utilities industry for CDS firms (14.00%) and Real estate and finance industry for non-CDS firms
(14.97%).
[Insert Table 2 near here]
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of the variables used in our main analyses. Following
Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), we define CDS_FIRM as a dummy variable that equals one if the firm
has a CDS contract traded during our sample period and zero otherwise. CDS_TRADE is a dummy
variable that takes a value of one after CDS inception for CDS firms and zero otherwise.
Effectively, it is an interaction of two dummy variables, CDS_FIRM (a variable that takes a value
of one for CDS firms and zero otherwise) × POST_CDS (a variable that takes a value of one for
years after CDS inception for the treatment firms and their matched control firms and zero
otherwise). The mean of CDS_TRADE and CDS_FIRM is 0.0596 and 0.1230, respectively,
indicating that firms with CDS contracts on their outstanding debt represent around 12 percent of our
sample and those firms have their CDSs traded in approximately half of our study years. The mean
value of BD_INDEP is 0.7282, indicating that three-fourths of boards of directors are independent.
Mean Duality is 0.6381, showing that 64 percent of observations have CEOs also holding the
position of board chairman. These descriptive statistics of corporate governance characteristics are
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largely consistent with those reported by prior studies (e.g., Byrd and Hickman 1992; Shivdasani 1993;
Brickley, Coles, and Terry 1994; Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner 1997; Gillette, Noe, and Rebello
2003; Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, and Dalton 2006).
[Insert Table 3 near here]
The mean of ERC and RSQ is 0.133 and 0.363, respectively. These statistics are consistent
with those reported in the literature (e.g., Easton and Harris 1991). The mean of DDAQ is −0.1087,
consistent with prior studies (e.g., Myers, Myers, and Omer 2003; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and
Schipper 2004, 2005). The mean of ABVOL is 1.0224, indicating that the volume of share trading
jumps up dramatically on earnings announcement dates. The mean of POSTRET and earnings
surprise (SUE) is −0.0008 and 0.0038, respectively. The negative value of POSTRET is consistent
with those documented by earlier works (e.g., Abarbanell and Bernard 1992; Mendenhall 2004;
Livnat and Mendenhall 2006). The positive average value of SUE indicates that firms beat analyst
expectations, on average. We later discuss univariate statistics showing the existence of the PEAD
phenomenon, evident from the positive and significant hedged portfolio return over three months
formed by taking long and short positions in observations with highest and lowest SUE, respectively.
IV. TESTS OF HYPOTHESES
This section presents tests of our two hypotheses.
Tests of H1: Changes in Corporate Governance upon CDS Inception
H1 examines whether shareholders demand improved corporate governance after CDS
inception. We estimate the following regression to test this hypothesis:
BD_INDEPi,t or Duality =β0 + β1 CDS_TRADEi,t + β2 CDS_FIRMi + ∑βn Controlsi,t +εi,t ,
i,t

(4)

where the dependent variable is BD_INDEP or Duality. The dummy variable CDS_TRADE takes
a value of one after CDS inception for CDS firms and zero otherwise. As noted earlier, it is
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effectively an interaction of two indicators, CDS_FIRM (a variable that takes a value of one for
CDS firms and zero otherwise) × POST_CDS (a variable that takes a value of one for years after
CDS inception for the treatment firms and their matched control firms and zero otherwise).
Including both CDS_TRADE and CDS_FIRM provides a difference-in-differences research design
to distinguish the effect of CDS inception relative to concurrent changes in non-CDS firms. Hence,
the coefficient on the variable CDS_TRADE represents the marginal effect of CDS introduction
on corporate governance after controlling for any changes in the characteristics of non-CDS firms
over the same time. If CDS firms enhance corporate governance following the onset of CDS
trading, relative to non-CDS firms, then β1 is expected to be significantly positive for the
BD_INDEP regression and negative for the Duality regression.
We follow prior research and include several control variables that affect the costs and
benefits of monitoring, advisory needs of the board of directors, and CEO influence (e.g., Guest
2008): firm size (log of firm assets, LNAT), financial leverage (LEV), Tobin’s Q (TOBINQ),
corporate research and development expenditure (RDEXP), cash balances (CASHSIZE),
profitability (return on assets, ROA), industry concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, HHI),
firm age (log of firm age, LNAGE), and standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the 12
months preceding the financial year-end (STRETVOL). We include year and industry fixed effects
in all regressions to control for year and industry idiosyncratic characteristics. Detailed variable
definitions are provided in the Appendix.
Table 4 reports results of the multivariate regression analysis with respect to the effect of
CDS trading upon corporate governance [Eq. (4)]. The first column reports results of Eq. (4) with
BD_INDEP as the dependent variable; the second column, with Duality as the dependent variable.
Coefficients are estimated using standard errors that are adjusted using a two-dimensional cluster
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at the industry and year level (Peterson 2009). For BD_INDEP, the coefficient on CDS_TRADE is
positive (0.0350) and significant (with p-value < 0.01), indicating that board independence
increases by 3.5%, on average, in the years following the onset of CDS trading. For Duality, the
coefficient is negative (−0.2968) and significant (with p-value < 0.05). While CEOs at firms with
CDS trades during our sample period are more likely to also hold the position of board chairman,
the CEO’s dual position decreases by 29.68% following the onset of CDS trading, a significant
change in corporate governance. These results support H1, positing that corporate governance
improves after CDS inception, and the idea that shareholders demand greater allocation of control
rights (Aghion and Bolton 1992).
[Insert Table 4 near here]
The coefficients on control variables are consistent with those reported by prior studies
(e.g., Guest 2008). The coefficients on firm size and firm age are significantly positive in both
regressions (with p-value < 0.05), consistent with the notion that larger firms have a higher
percentage of outside directors and CEOs are likely to be the chairman of board. ROA is
significantly negative for the BD_INDEP regression, yet significantly positive for the Duality
regression (with p-value < 0.05 for both regressions). These results are consistent with the view
that well-performing CEOs are able to negotiate a dual position with a lower number of outside
directors.
Tests of H2: Changes in Shareholder Attention and Earnings Quality after CDS Inception
H2 considers whether shareholders become more attentive to financial reports after CDS
inception or demand higher quality financial reporting. We estimate the following regression to
test this hypothesis:
DependentVariablei,t =β0 + β1 CDS_TRADEi,t + β2 CDS_FIRMi + ∑βn Controlsi,t +εi,t ,
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(5)

where the dependent variable is one of the five variables: ERC, R_Square, DDAQ, ABVOL, or
PEAD. The definitions of CDS_FIRM and CDS_TRADE are the same as above. The coefficient
on the variable CDS_TRADE represents the marginal effect of CDS introduction on the dependent
variable relative to the effect on non-CDS firms. If the variables increase (decrease) for CDS
following the onset of CDS trading, relative to changes in non-CDS firms over same time, then β1
is predicted to be significantly positive (negative).
We include a set of control variables that are known to influence earnings quality by prior
research: firm size (LNAT), profitability (ROA), financial leverage (LEV), growth opportunity
(MTB), and volatility of firm operation (SALESVOL and CFVOL). We also include loss intensity
(percentage of loss years in the last four years, LOSS%), sales growth (D_Salesgrowth), and firm’s
size-adjusted stock performance in the measurement year (ABRET) when the dependent variable
is ERC, R_Square, or DDAQ. This set of controls is consistent with those used by DeFond and
Park (2001) and Francis et al. (2004, 2005). When the dependent variable is ABVOL, the control
variables are absolute value of the log of one plus the three-day market-adjusted returns around
annual earnings announcement (ABSLNRET), log of stock price (LNPRC), log of market value
(LNMKV), profitability (ROA), financial leverage (LEV), growth opportunity (MTB), and sales
growth (D_Salesgrowth). These control variables are consistent with Hope et al. (2009). We
include year and industry fixed effects in all regressions to control for year and industry
idiosyncratic characteristics. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix.
The first two columns of Panel A of Table 5 report results of Eq. (3) with ERC and RSQ as
the dependent variables. Coefficients are estimated using standard errors that are adjusted using a
two-dimensional cluster at the industry and year level (Peterson 2009). The coefficient on
CDS_TRADE is significantly positive for both ERC and RSQ at 0.0643 and 0.0097, respectively
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(with p-values < 0.01 for both regression models). These results support H2, positing that earnings
relevance increases subsequent to CDS inception.
[Insert Table 5 near here]
The third column of Panel A reports results with DDAQ as the dependent variable. DDAQ
is the standard deviation of the firm-level residuals from the Dechow and Dichev model as
modified by McNichols (2002) over three years and multiplied by negative one. We drop the
observations of CDS firms in the CDS initiation year and the next year to avoid the overlap of the
estimation period of DDAQ between pre– and post–CDS periods. The coefficient on CDS_TRADE
is significant and positive (with p-value < 0.05). Following the onset of CDS trading, DDAQ
increases by 4.44%, on average, which is economically significant, given that the mean of DDAQ
is −0.1087. Because ERC, RSQ, and DDAQ are widely and commonly accepted proxies for
earnings quality, our results show that CDS initiation is followed by improvement in quality of
financial reporting, at least from the equity investors’ valuation perspective.
The last column of Table 5 Panel A reports results with ABVOL as the dependent variable.
The coefficient on CDS_TRADE is significantly positive (with p-value < 0.05), showing an
increase in trading volume following the onset of CDS trading. This result, combined with the
results on RSQ and ERC, are consistent with the idea that investors pay greater attention to earnings
announcements and use the information contained in earnings in price formation to a larger extent,
post–CDS inception.
We next examine PEAD, which is a proxy for investors’ underreaction to value-relevant
information in earnings. For the PEAD tests, we categorize all firms into tertiles by the signed
value of SUE by calendar quarters and then retain only the top and bottom tertiles. We report the
results in Panels B and C of Table 5. Panel B presents the univariate analysis results, based on the
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firms only in the top and bottom tertiles. Panel B shows that the PEAD phenomenon is significant
for both CDS and non-CDS firms, on average. Hedges portfolio returns are 0.0093 and 0.0240,
respectively, both statistically significant. This result indicates that the PEAD phenomenon exists
in our sample. This measure of PEAD declines from 0.0185 (significant) to −0.0013 (insignificant)
from pre–CDS years to post–CDS years for the CDS firms. These results support H2 on a
univariate basis.
Panel C presents the multivariate results. TopTertileSUE is an indicator that takes a value
of one if firm-year is categorized in the top tertile of SUE and zero otherwise. Panel C shows that
the coefficient on TopTertileSUE is significantly positive (with p-value < 0.01), indicating that
PEAD is statistically and economic significant for our sample CDS and non-CDS firms. However,
the coefficient on TopTertileSUE × CDS_TRADE is significantly negative (with p-value < 0.01),
supporting H2, which states that investor attention increases and the underreaction to earnings
news decreases following the onset of CDS trading. PEAD for the top SUE tertile for CDS firms
decreases by 1.68%, on average, subsequent to the CDS trading relative to those for the non-CDS
firms.
V. CONTEXTS WITH GREATER H1 AND H2 EFFECTS
In this section, we examine whether our H1 and H2 findings apply more strongly in certain
contexts than others. We test whether our above results on the improvements in corporate
governance and earnings quality substitute for the increase in managers’ voluntary disclosure post
CD inception. In addition, we examine four contexts, based on borrower and lender characteristic,
to strengthen our identification strategy of weaker lender monitoring post CD inception: increase
in lender’s risk-weighted assets, borrower default risk, financial covenant intensity, and the
number of lenders.
25

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3094968

Borrower Characteristic: Conditional on Earnings Forecasts
Kim et al. (2017) show that managers respond to shareholder demands for greater
information, post–CDS inception, by providing more frequent earnings forecasts (Kim et al. 2017).
Despite the existence of managers’ earnings guidance, shareholders consider financial reports as a
significant source of relevant information for valuation (Beyer et al. 2010; Holthausen and Watts
2001). Furthermore, earnings are used for managerial contracting and stewardship purposes
(Holthausen and Watts 2001). So, the quality of mandated financial reports should also improve
post–CDS inception. Nevertheless, value relevant information in voluntary earnings guidance
could preempt information provide by mandatory earnings reports (Kim and Verrecchia 1997;
Cheynel and Levine 2015). Therefore, we expect a post–CDS demand for improvement in
corporate governance and financial reporting quality to be higher when managers do not provide,
and thus do not improve, voluntary earnings guidance.
We conduct H1 and H2 tests by dividing our sample into two groups—firm-year
observations with earnings forecasts (EF) and without earnings forecasts (No EF). We then
separately estimate Eqs. (4) and (5) for those two groups and test the statistical significance of the
difference of coefficients on CDS_TRADE. As shown in Panel A of Table 6, the coefficient on
CDS_TRADE is higher for the No EF group than the EF group, when the dependent variable is
BD_INDEP (with p-values < 0.01), supporting the view that shareholders step up actions to secure
their interests when more information is not forthcoming from managers on a voluntary basis after
CDS trading. However, we do not find significant differences between the two groups when the
dependent variable is Duality. Panel B of Table 6 shows that the coefficient on CDS_TRADE is
higher for the No EF group than the EF group, when the dependent variable is ERC, RSQ, and
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ABVOL (with p-values < 0.01). We do not find significant differences between the two groups for
DDAQ.
In H1 and H2 tests, described in Section IV, we find strong support for the idea that
shareholders take greater interest in firm affairs post–CDS inception, as advanced by Kim et al.
(2017). Results from four out of our six dependent variables complement Kim et al. (2017) by
showing an additional yet important instance in which this idea is manifested—attention to
mandated financial reports and corporate governance, when managers do not improve information
provision on a voluntary basis.
[Insert Table 6 near here]
Lender Monitoring: Increase in Risk-Weighted Assets
We document a positive correlation between the onset of CDS trading and shareholder
attentiveness, and our tests assume that lenders hedge their risks post–CDS inception. An ideal test
would focus only on lenders that buy CDS protection on the reference firm’s credit risk. However,
identifying CDS traders is empirically challenging because CDS contracts are largely traded over
the counter and the parties have no obligation to reveal their trades to investors. In this subsection,
we rely on previous research and strive to identify CDS traders.
We follow the approach of Martin and Roychowdhury (2015). They illustrate that banks
likely purchase CDS contracts to hedge their exposure to the underlying borrower’s credit risk when
the percentage of total risk-weighted assets for a bank that lends to a borrower with CDS contracts
increases in the same year as the onset of the CDS contracts. We distinguish lending banks by
extracting data on lending relationships from the Dealscan database, and we manually collect the
risk weights on banks’ assets from the Federal Reserve’s Y-9C reports. We create the variable
POS_RISKASSET, which takes a value of one if the lending bank exhibits an increase in the
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percentage of total risk-weighted assets in the same year of CDS initiation, and zero otherwise.
That bank is likely to have hedged its risk with respect to the focal firm. We then categorize the
sample into two groups: one in which lenders likely hedged their risk (More Likely) and another in
which it is less likely (Less Likely). We then separately estimate our multivariate regression models
[Eqs. (4)–(5)] for each group.
Panel A of Table 7 presents the regression results. When the dependent variable is
BD_INDEP, the coefficient on CDS_TRADE is positive and significant only for the group in which
lenders likely hedged their risk (with p-value of difference in coefficients being less than 0.10).
However, we have insignificant difference when the dependent variable is Duality.
[Insert Table 7 near here]
Panel B of Table 7 presents the regression results when the dependent variable is ERC, RSQ,
DDAQ, or ABVOL. For each variable, the coefficient on CDS_TRADE is bigger for the subgroup in
which lenders more likely hedged their risk (More Likely) than for the subgroup in which lenders
less likely hedged their risk (Less Likely) (with p-value of difference in coefficients being less than
0.10). This finding are consistent with the proposition that investor interest and earnings relevance and
usefulness increase to a greater extent when lenders change their behavior after the onset of CDS
trading.
Lender Monitoring: Borrower Default risk
Lead bank suffers reputation costs in loan syndicate markets when inadequate monitoring
is a contributing factor towards borrower default (Gopalan, Nanda, and Yerramilli 2011).
However, such reputational fallout is lower when loans are made to riskier clients because it is
difficult to identify the lead bank’s poor monitoring as the main cause for borrower default. So, to
the extent that banks lower their monitoring upon obtaining CDS protection, and this lowering is
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moderated by banks’ reputational concerns, that moderation would be lower when loans are made
to riskier clients. Consistent with this idea, Ashcraft and Santos (2009) find that post-CDS loan
spreads increase to a great extent for riskier clients. Kim et al. (2017) find greater post CDS
inception increase in management forecasts for clients with greater default risk.
Accordingly, we expect improvement in corporate governance and earnings quality, that is
associated with reduced lender monitoring following the onset of CDS trading, to be more
pronounced for riskier borrowers. To test our prediction, we categorize firm-year observations into
two groups (Low Default Risk and High Default Risk), based on the sample median of modified Zscore score model (Altman (1968; Campello et al. 2011). We then conduct H1 and H2 tests
separately in these two subgroups. Table 8 report the results, conditional on the default risk.
[Insert Table 8 near here]
Panel A of Table 8, the effect of CDS trading on corporate governance variables, while Panel
B reports the results of the earnings quality proxies. We find that bigger coefficients on CDS_TRADE
for the High Default Risk group when the independent variable is BD_INDEP, ERC, and ABVOL.
The differences between Low Default Risk and High Default Risk are not significant when Duality,
RSQ, and DDAQ are the independent variables for the coefficients of other three variables. Thus,
we find partial support for the idea of greater heightening of shareholder interest, associated with
reduced lender monitoring after the onset of CDS trading, for borrowers closer to debt default.
Lender Monitoring: Financial Covenants
Lenders monitor borrower’s operating and investing activities principally through financial
covenants (Dichev and Skinner 2002, Nini et al. 2009). These covenants serve as automatic
“tripwires” whose violations affect borrowers’ activities such as investments, net debt issuance,
line-of-credit availability, and could cause changes in management (Chava and Roberts 2008,
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Roberts and Sufi 2009, Nini et al. 2009, 2012). Therefore, a larger (smaller) number of financial
covenants implies greater (weaker) effect of lender monitoring on the borrower behavior. All else
held equal, thus, any post CDS inception change in borrower behavior, caused by reduced lender
monitoring, should be more pronounced for firms with fewer financial covenants (Kim et al. 2017).
To test this prediction, we follow Kim et al. (2017) to categorize the sample into two
groups, based on the sample median of a firm’s average number of financial covenants across its
syndicated loans per year—(1) firms with less than or equal to the sample median of financial
covenants in a loan contract (Fewer Financial Covenants) and (2) firms with greater than the sample
median of financial covenants (More Financial Covenants). We estimate the number of financial
covenants as the total number of financial covenants in a loan contract (e.g., Hong, Hung and
Zhang 2015). All variables are defined in the Appendix. We then reestimate Eqs. (2)–(5) separately
for these two groups. Table 9 report those results.
[Insert Table 9 near here]
Panel A of Table 9 shows that the effect of CDS trading on board independence is stronger
for the Fewer Financial Covenants group versus the More Financial Covenants group, as indicated
by a significant difference of coefficients on CDS_TRADE (with p-value < 0.10). Similarly, the
effect of CDS trading upon CEO duality is negative and significant only for the Fewer Financial
Covenants subgroup, and the difference between two subgroups is significant (with p-value < 0.01).
Panel B of Table 9 reports the results of the earnings quality proxies. We find that the positive
effect of CDS trading upon ERC , RSQ and DDAQ is stronger for the Fewer Financial Covenants
group, as indicated by a significant difference of coefficients on CDS_TRADE between two
subgroups (with p-value < 0.05). However, we find insignificant differences with respect to ABVOL.
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For five out of six study variables, the effect of CDS initiation on earnings quality and corporate
governance is significantly stronger for firms with fewer financial covenants.
Lender Monitoring: Syndicated Lenders versus Sole Lenders
Prior studies indicate that when loan is obtained from a syndicate of lenders than from a
single lender, free-rider problem in monitoring and information asymmetry and coordination costs
between lender and borrower are more severe, and contractual flexibility and capacity to
renegotiate is lower (Preecea and Mullineaux 1996, Ivashina 2009). Amiram et al. (2017)
document that the lead arranger’s share of the loan and premium demanded by syndicate members
increases following the onset of CDS trading, indicating that syndicate participants anticipate
lowering of lead banker’s monitoring post CDS inception. Similarly, Kim et al. (2017) find lower
demand for management forecasts when lead arranger has higher than the median share of loans,
that is, when the lead banker has higher economic stake in the loan. Extending this logic, the
heightening of shareholder should be least pronounced when the lender holds 100% of loans.
To test this conjecture, we categorize firm-year observations into two groups, Syndicated
and Solo Lender, by using the data on the lead arrangers of their syndicated loans from DealScan.
All variables are defined in the Appendix. We then conduct H1 and H2 tests separately for these two
groups. Table 10 report the results, conditional on the loan syndication.
[Insert Table 10 near here]
Panel A of Table 10 shows that the effect of CDS trading on board independence is stronger
for the Syndicated group versus the Solo Lender group (difference has p-value < 0.10) but the
difference is not significant for Duality. Panel B of Table 10 reports the results of the earnings
quality proxies. We find that the improvements in ERC, RSQ, and DDAQ are stronger for the
Syndicated group (differences have p-values < 0.05), but not for ABVOL These results are consistent
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with the view that when there are coordination frictions among syndication members, a decline in
lender monitoring and lender interest in continuation of the borrower occurs to a greater extent
following the onset of CDS trading than when the loan is obtained from a solo bank. Shareholders
step up their information acquisition and strengthen their monitoring to protect their interest,
depending on whether or not the loan was obtained from a syndicate of banks.
V. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Specification
To further address the endogeneity concern related to the onset of CDS trading, we use a
2SLS specification. In the first stage, we estimate a regression of a binary variable, CDS_TRADE,
on all control variables of the CDS determinant model specified in Eq. (2) and on two instrumental
variables: Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume and Investment Grade/Speculative Grade
Frontier (Kim et al. 2017). These two variables predict the onset of CDS trading but are likely to
be unrelated to the residuals in the second-stage regression. The first proxies for the degree to which
lenders hedge in the bond market in the absence of the CDS market. Oehmke and Zawadowski
(2015) show that credit investors elect the CDS market as the trading venue for their credit hedging
and for speculative purposes when they experience trading frictions in the underlying bond market.
Following their study, we measure this variable by the average of the industry peers’ bond trading
volume (Boehmer, Chava, and Tookes 2015; Kim et al. 2017). Bond trading volume, which provides
liquidity to investors, is predicted to mitigate trading frictions and reduce investors’ demand for
hedging and speculation through CDS contracts, thus decreasing the likelihood of the onset of CDS
contracts. We gather data on the bond trading volume for industry peers from the Trade Reporting
and Compliance Engine (TRACE) database. We also extract data on the face value of the traded
bonds at the issue date from the Mergent database. We estimate bond trading volume by dividing
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the dollar volume of a traded bond by its face value. We then measure the average bond trading
volume of industry peers each year. We standardize this measure by converting it into a decile rank
(Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume).
Our second instrumental variable, Investment Grade/Speculative Grade Frontier, represents
the demand for CDS trade. Qiu and Yu (2012) show an inverse U-shaped relationship between CDS
liquidity and credit rating. Bond investors’ hedging demand is the highest for bonds at the border of
investment and speculative grades. Bonds with very high credit quality have little hedging demand
because of their high credit quality, and bonds with below-investment grades have a very steep cost
of credit protection. We thus create Investment Grade/Speculative Grade Frontier, which is an
indicator variable that equals one if the credit rating of a firm’s bonds is close to the crossover
from investment to speculative grades and zero otherwise; that is, the bonds have an average credit
rating of BBB–, BBB, or BBB+. We collect corporate long-term bond credit ratings from
Compustat.
We present the results of our probit model of board independence in Panel A of Table 11.
We use CDS_TRADE as the dependent variable and Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume and
Investment Grade/Speculative Grade Frontier as an inverse and a direct proxy, respectively, for
bond investors’ trading demand. As expected, the coefficients on Industry Peers’ Bond Trading
Volume and Investment Grade/Speculative Grade Frontier are significantly negative and positive,
respectively (with p-value < 0.01).
[Insert Table 11near here]
In the second stage, we use the predicted value of CDS_TRADE from the first stage and
estimate a regression of board independence proxies (BD_IND and Duality) using the fitted value
of CDS_TRADE. Results for those tests are presented in the last two columns of Table 8, Panel A.
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The coefficient on CDS_TRADE is positive and significant for BD_IND (with p-value < 0.01) and
is insignificant and positive for Duality. To validate our choice of instrumental variables, we follow
Larcker and Rusticus (2010) and implement weak instrument identification tests.8 These results
suggest that the instrument passes the weak instrument tests and that it explains a significant amount
of the variation in corporate governance structure.
We also use a 2SLS method to address the endogeneity concern related to the onset of CDS
trading in our earnings quality analysis. In the first stage, we estimate a regression of a binary
variable, CDS_TRADE, on all control variables of the CDS determinant model specified in Eq. (2)
and on two instrumental variables: Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume and Investment
Grade/Speculative Grade Frontier. In the second stage, we use the predicted value of CDS_TRADE
from the first stage and estimate a regression of earnings quality proxies (ERC, RSQ, DDAQ, and
ABVOL) using the fitted value of CDS_TRADE. Results for those tests are presented in Panels B–D
of Table 8. The coefficient on CDS_TRADE is positive for ERC, RSQ, DDAQ, and ABVOL (with pvalue < 0.01). Thus, our main results remain qualitatively unchanged using the 2SLS model,
indicating that they are less likely contaminated by endogeneity issues. To validate our choice of
instrumental variables, we follow Larcker and Rusticus (2010) and implement weak instrument
identification tests.9 These results suggest that the instrument passes the weak instrument tests and
that it explains a significant amount of the variation in corporate risk-taking behavior.

The partial F is 1504.74 (p-value < 0.0001), and the under-identification test (chi-squared) is 56.51 (p-value <
0.0001). These results suggest that the instrument passes the under-identification test and explains a significant amount
of the variation in CDS trading inception. The weak instrument test yields a Cragg-Donald Wald F of 28.20 that is
significant at p-value less than 0.05 based on Stock-Yogo critical value table.
9 For Panel B, the partial F is 1386.03 (p-value < 0.0001), and the under-identification test (chi-squared) is 7,693.69
(p-value < 0.0001). For Panel C, the partial F is 766.53 (p-value < 0.0001), and the under-identification test (chisquared) is 3620.82 (p-value < 0.0001). Finally, for Panel D, the partial F is 368.96 (p-value < 0.0001), and the underidentification test (chi-squared) is 1750.76 (p-value < 0.0001). These results suggest that the instrument passes the
under-identification test and explains a significant amount of the variation in CDS trading inception. The weak
instrument test yields a Cragg-Donald Wald F ranging from 53.87 (p-value < 0.01) for Panel D to 872.88 (p-value <
8
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VI. CONCLUSION
Most borrowers enter into loan agreements with an understanding that the lender would
renegotiate the loan terms and would accommodate their needs in the event of adverse economic
developments. A bank’s interest in accommodating a distressed client’s needs, however, declines
after the bank purchases a CDS-based insurance on the client’s loan. CDS trades are therefore
followed by increased lender intransigence and higher frequency of borrower bankruptcy. The
creation of CDS markets also provides insiders with an avenue to trade on their private information
about bankruptcy risk without having to reveal those trades to outsiders. The onset of CDS trade
thus increases the likelihood of loss of values of external shareholders relative to those of lenders
and insider shareholders. In this study, we find results consistent with the notion that the outside
shareholders of a CDS-referenced firm respond to the onset of CDS trading, an event beyond their
control, by demanding improved corporate governance and financial reporting quality.
We find an increase in the percentage of independent directors and a decline in the duality
of the joint CEO-chairman position in the years following the onset of CDS trades. Prior literature
shows that both of these factors are associated with enhanced protection of outsiders’ rights. We
also find increases in earnings response coefficient and trading volumes around the earnings
announcement dates. In addition, the quality of working capital accruals improves and the post–
earnings announcement drift declines. These results indicate that outside shareholders pay greater
attention to financial reports or demand improvement in the quality of financial reports. Overall,
our results indicate heightened shareholder interest in firm affairs and a contingent reallocation of
control rights between managers, lenders, and shareholders post–CDS inception.

0.01) for Panel B, compared with the Stock-Yogo critical value. Stock and Yogo (2005) provide a critical value table
for a 5% Max IV size 24.09, 10% Max IV size 16.38, and 15% Max IV size 8.96.
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We find that the proxies of earnings quality change in directions consistent with their
improvement from the equity shareholders’ valuation informativeness perspective, in contrast to
the prior finding of decline in conservatism, a significant earnings quality proxy from the lenders’
perspective. Hence, our study also documents a financial market development that is followed by
opposite shifts in attributes of financial reporting systems from the shareholders’ and lenders’
perspectives.
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APPENDIX. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
ABSLNRET = Absolute value of the log of one plus the three-day market-adjusted returns around the
annual earnings announcement (day −1 to 1). (Source: CRSP)
ABRET = Firm’s annual size-adjusted returns for fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat North America)
ABVOL = Firm's actual trading volume for three days around earnings announcement period (day −1 to 1)
less the mean of trading volume for the 60 days, scaled by the standard deviation of firm's
trading volume for the 60 days preceding the annual announcement interval. (Source: CRSP)
BD_INDEP = Number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors. [Source:
Institutional Shareholder Services (formerly RiskMetrics)]
CASHSIZE = Cash and cash equivalent divided by total assets at the end of fiscal year t. (Source:
Compustat North America)
CDS_FIRM = Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm has traded CDSs anytime during our
study period and zero otherwise. (Source: Markit)
CDS_TRADE = Dummy variable that takes a value of one after the inception of CDS trading for CDS
firms and zero otherwise. (Source: Markit)
CFVOL = Standard deviation of firm’s operating cash flow over total assets from fiscal year t − 4 to fiscal
year t. (Source: Compustat North America)
D_Salesgrowth = Change in net sales in year t divided by net sales in year t − 1. (Source: Compustat
North America)
DDAQ = Standard deviation of the firm-level residuals from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model as
modified by McNichols (2002) over three years and multiplied by negative one. The model is a
regression of working capital accruals on lagged, current, and future cash flows plus the change
in revenue and property, plant, and equipment. All variables are scaled by average total assets.
The model is estimated cross-sectionally for each industry with at least 20 observations in a given
year based on the Fama and French (1997) 48 industry classification. We drop CDS initiation
year’s and next year’s observations. (Source: Compustat North America)
Duality = Indicator variable that equals one if the company’s CEO is also chairman of the board and zero
otherwise (Source: Institutional Shareholder Services)
ERC = Earnings response coefficient. We estimate each firm-year’s ERC by regressing cumulative sizeadjusted three-day stock returns on the quarterly earnings surprise. To estimate firm-year’s ERC,
we regress cumulative three-day size-adjusted stock returns on the quarterly earnings
announcement date on quarterly earnings change for each firm year. We measure ERC by the
coefficient on ΔEarnings. (Source: Compustat North America and CRSP)
HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry
measured at the end of fiscal year t.
Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume = Average annual bond trading volume for a firm’s two-digit SIC
industry peers. (Source: TRACE)
Investment Grade/Speculative Grade Frontier = Indicator variable that takes a value of one if a firm’s
long-term bonds outstanding in a given year have an average credit rating of BBB-, BBB, or
BBB+ and zero otherwise. (Source: Compustat North America)
LEV = Total debt (short-term debt plus long-term debt) divided by total assets at the end of fiscal year t.
(Source: Compustat North America)
LenderReputation = Derived from the principal component analysis based on two variables: natural
logarithm of firm market value of equity and long-term Standard & Poor’s (S&P) credit rating.
Credit rating is defined by an ordinal variable ranging between 1 (AAA) and 19 (CCC-) for firms
with S&P long-term debt rating. We assign a value of 20 for firms in default stage and 21 for
firms with no debt rating.
LNAT = Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat North America)
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LNFIRMAGE = Natural log of firm i’s age, approximated by the number of years listed on CRSP.
(Source: CRSP)
LNMKV = Natural logarithm of firm’s market value at the end of fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat North
America)
LNAGE = Natural logarithm of firm’s market value at the end of fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat North
America)
LNPRC = Log of price two days before the annual earnings announcement. (Source: CRSP)
LOSS% = Loss intensity over the previous four-year period deﬁned as the number of years that a ﬁrm has
negative pre-tax book income from year t - 4 to year t - 1 scaled to range between zero and one.
(Source: Compustat North America)
MTB = Market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of fiscal year t. Market value is
a firm’s market capitalization, calculated as (number of outstanding shares × market price).
(Source: Compustat North America)
Non–CDS Firm = A firm that is not CDS Firm.
PEAD = Difference in the mean POSTRET between the top and bottom tertiles formed by the magnitude
of SUE.
POSTRET = Three-month (+2 to +64 trading days following the announcement) buy-and-hold return
adjusted for contemporaneous buy-and-hold value-weighted market index return.
RDEXP = Research and development expenditure divided by total assets at the end of fiscal year t. Set to
zero if missing. (Source: Compustat North America)
ROA = Net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the end of fiscal year t. (Source:
Compustat North America)
RSQ = R-squared from firm-year’s ERC regression. We regress cumulative three-day size-adjusted stock
returns on the quarterly earnings announcement date on quarterly earnings change for each firmyear. (Source: Compustat North America and CRSP)
SALEVOL = Standard deviation of firm’s sales over total assets from fiscal year t − 4 to fiscal year t.
(Source: Compustat North America)
STRET = Firm’s annual stock return for fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat North America)
STRETVOL = Standard deviation of a firm’s monthly stock return in fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat
North America)
SUE = Actual earnings per share minus last analyst consensus at least three days before the quarterly
earnings announcement, scaled by stock price at least six but not more than 12 days prior to
quarterly earnings announcement.
TOBINQ = Book value of total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity divided by
book value of total assets at the end of fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat North America)
TopTertile = Indicator variable that takes a value of one if firm-year is for the top tertile of SUE and zero
otherwise.
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TABLE 1
Sample Selection
Panel A: Selection of Samples for Different Tests
Sample
Corporate governance
Compustat firm-year observations, 1988–2014
Less:
Firm-years missing total assets (net sales) and less than $1 million total assets (net
sales)
Firm-years missing control variables and incomplete observations
Firm-years missing corporate governance measure

Firm-years
334,866
(77,684)
(106,884)
(128,891)

Testing board independence (2,722 unique firms)

21,407

ERC/RSQ, DDAQ, and ABVOL
Compustat firm-year observations, 1983–2014
Less:
Firm-years missing total assets (net sales) and less than $1 million total assets (net
sales)
Firm-years missing control variables and incomplete observations
Firm-years missing ERC / RSQ sample

373,788
(107,117)
(132,138)
(30,741)

Testing ERC / RSQ (11,682 unique firms)
Firm-years missing DDAQ

(38,989)

103,792

Testing DDAQ (8,712 unique firms)
Firm-years missing ABVOL

(46,294)

64,803

Testing ABVOL (2,243 unique firms)

18,509

PEAD
Compustat firm-quarter observations, 1983–2014
Less:
Firm-quarters with insufficient data and missing SUE and POSTRET
Firm-quarters not matched with ERC/RSQ Sample
Firm-quarters middle tertiles of SUE

Firm-quarters
1,350,084
(906,393)
(32,155)
(149,079)

Testing PEAD (11,155 unique firms)

262,457
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Panel B: Yearly Distribution
CDS_FIRM
NON CDS_FIRM
Year
Frequency
Percent
Frequency
Percent
1983
26
0.20
235
0.25
1984
239
1.80
1,672
1.77
1985
236
1.78
1,740
1.85
1986
246
1.86
1,831
1.94
1987
253
1.91
1,852
1.97
1988
263
1.98
1,880
2.00
1989
293
2.21
2,129
2.26
1990
303
2.29
2,257
2.40
1991
316
2.38
2,368
2.51
1992
321
2.42
2,427
2.58
1993
335
2.53
2,593
2.75
1994
342
2.58
2,715
2.88
1995
365
2.75
2,890
3.07
1996
389
2.94
3,054
3.24
1997
411
3.10
3,268
3.47
1998
426
3.21
3,269
3.47
1999
458
3.46
3,626
3.85
2000
478
3.61
3,601
3.82
2001
488
3.68
3,388
3.60
2002
503
3.80
3,531
3.75
2003
512
3.86
3,451
3.66
2004
514
3.88
3,359
3.57
2005
522
3.94
3,700
3.93
2006
517
3.90
3,612
3.83
2007
512
3.86
3,544
3.76
2008
510
3.85
3,444
3.66
2009
509
3.84
3,470
3.68
2010
500
3.77
3,328
3.53
2011
497
3.75
3,247
3.45
2012
500
3.77
3,189
3.39
2013
491
3.71
3,183
3.38
2014
494
3.73
3,170
3.37
Total
12,769
100.00
91,023
100.00
Panel A describes the selection of sample of firms to examine H1 and H2. Panel B presents the yearly
distribution of the sample for ERC and RSQ tests, the largest sample among all tests. All variables are
defined in the Appendix.
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TABLE 2
Sample Distribution by Industry (Number of Firm-Years)

Industry
Basic industry
Capital goods industry
Construction industry
Consumer durables industry
Food and tobacco industry
Leisure industry
Other industries
Petroleum industry
Real estate and finance industry
Services industry
Textiles and trade industry
Transportation industry
Utilities industry
Total

CDS_FIRM
Frequency
Percent
2,055
16.09
1,250
9.79
413
3.23
1,390
10.89
601
4.71
462
3.62
198
1.55
762
5.97
1,687
13.21
859
6.73
980
7.67
324
2.54
1,788
14.00
12,769
100.00

NON CDS_FIRM
Frequency
Percent
9,977
10.96
13,064
14.35
1,681
1.85
14,573
16.01
2,667
2.93
3,782
4.15
3,302
3.63
3,396
3.73
13,622
14.97
11,554
12.69
5,578
6.13
2,181
2.40
5,646
6.20
91,023
100.00

This table reports the sample distribution across the Campbell (1987) industry classifications for the sample
used for the ERC and RSQ tests. The sample consists of 103,792 firm-year observations for the period
between 1983 and 2015. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
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TABLE 3
Sample Descriptive Statistics
25th
50th
75th
Standard
Percentile
Percentile
Percentile
Deviation
CDS_TRADE
0.0596
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.2367
CDS_FIRM
0.1230
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.3285
BD_INDEP
0.7282
0.6364
0.7500
0.8571
0.1665
Duality
0.6381
0.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.4806
ERC
0.1337
−0.0365
0.0061
0.1361
0.9357
RSQ
0.3635
0.0735
0.2865
0.6201
0.3125
ABVOL
1.0224
−0.1646
0.3832
1.4911
1.8249
DDAQ
−0.1087
−0.1081
−0.0516
−0.0260
0.1618
LNAT
5.9691
4.3724
5.8576
7.4205
2.1397
ROA
−0.0019
−0.0046
0.0320
0.0712
0.1676
LEV
0.1804
0.0113
0.1290
0.2907
0.1880
MTB
2.5163
1.0774
1.7216
2.9250
3.2551
SALESVOL
0.1714
0.0556
0.1176
0.2223
0.1784
CFVOL
0.0700
0.0244
0.0465
0.0853
0.0771
LOSS%
0.2491
0.0000
0.2000
0.4000
0.3195
D_Salesgrowth
−0.0286
−0.1465
−0.0116
0.1080
0.4428
ABRET
−0.4964
−6.9588
−1.0945
4.9431
12.3512
LNPRC
2.4452
1.7707
2.6119
3.2629
1.1297
POSTRET
−0.0008
−0.0138
0.0044
0.0133
0.0658
SUE
0.0038
−0.0913
0.0116
0.1090
0.2118
TopTertile
0.5009
0.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.5000
This table reports descriptive statistics for the sample firms. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
Variable

Mean
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TABLE 4
Changes in Corporate Governance in the Years following the Onset of Credit Default Swap (CDS)
Trading
Variable

BD_INDEP

CDS_TRADE

0.0350
(5.51)***
−0.0135
(−1.34)
0.0094
(3.15)***
0.0095
(0.42)
−0.0054
(−2.60)***
0.1465
(3.09)***
0.0190
(0.93)
−0.0286
(−2.14)**
−0.0448
(−0.79)
0.0218
(2.33)**
0.0000
(0.03)

CDS_FIRM
LNAT
LEV
TOBINQ
RDEXP
CASHSIZE
ROA
HHI
LNAGE
STRETVOL

Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
R-squared / pseudo R-squared

Yes
Yes
21,407
0.173

Duality
−0.2968
(−1.98)**
0.3862
(2.24)**
0.2306
(4.53)***
−0.0853
(−0.47)
0.0304
(1.56)
−2.1040
(−4.15)***
0.0180
(0.10)
0.2554
(2.32)**
−0.5759
(−1.11)
0.2105
(4.05)***
0.0185
(2.66)***
Yes
Yes
21,407
0.087

This table reports the effect of CDS trading upon board independence: BD_INDEP and Duality. All
variables are defined in the Appendix. The sample consists of 14,708 non-CDS firm-years and 6,699 CDS
firm-years (1,763 firm-years for pre–CDS initiation and 4,936 firm-years for post–CDS initiation). Year
and industry fixed effects are included. t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by year and
industry are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively,
two-tailed in control variables and one-tailed when discussing the results of hypothesis tests with predicted
signs of coefficient estimates.
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TABLE 5
Changes in Financial Reporting Quality in the Years following the Onset of Credit Default Swap (CDS) Trading
Panel A: Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC) and R-Squared (RSQ)
Variable
CDS_TRADE
CDS_FIRM
LNAT
ROA
LEV
MTB
SALESVOL
CFVOL
LOSS%
D_Salesgrowth
ABRET

ERC

RSQ

DDAQ

ABVOL

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.0643
(5.69)***
−0.0291
(−2.51)**
−0.0653
(−6.54)***
0.2408
(6.83)***
−0.0516
(−2.44)**
0.0019
(1.32)
−0.0644
(−1.99)**
−0.2839
(−3.70)***
−0.2367
(−6.80)***
0.0154
(3.00)***
0.0005
(3.24)***

0.0097
(2.90)***
−0.0057
(−2.32)**
−0.0054
(−5.17)***
0.0094
(1.75)*
0.0088
(1.12)
−0.0004
(−0.99)
−0.0047
(−1.40)
0.0042
(0.20)
0.0035
(0.81)
0.0014
(0.53)
−0.0001
(−1.25)

0.0444
(2.24)**
−0.0077
(−1.57)*
0.0047
(5.14)***
−0.0288
(−4.38)***
0.0144
(2.81)***
−0.0011
(−2.16)**
−0.0246
(−3.94)***
−0.3761
(−14.07)***
−0.0277
(−3.79)***
−0.0018
(−0.98)
0.0001
(2.89)***

0.2649
(2.46)**
−0.0197
(−0.22)

0.9465
(17.58)***
−0.0140
(−0.13)
−0.0017
(−0.28)

0.0632
(5.23)***

ABSLNRET

9.6359
(11.69)***
0.1459
(5.15)***
0.0421
(2.06)**

LNPRC
LNMKV

Industry fixed
effects
Year fixed effects

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
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Observations
R-squared

103,792
0.025

103,792
0.002

64,803
0.313

18,509
0.243
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Table 5 Continued.
Panel B: Univariate Analysis—PEAD
Full Sample
Tertile
Top tertile
Bottom tertile
Difference (top – bottom)

0.0176
(31.05)***
−0.0054
(−9.10)***
0.0230
(28.08)***

Non–CDS Firms
All years
0.0260
(17.33)**
0.0167
(9.82)***
0.0093
(4.15)***

0.0169
(28.17)***
−0.0071
(−11.83)***
0.0240
(27.74)***

CDS Firms
Pre-CDS
0.0317
(15.17)**
0.0132
(5.59)***
0.0185
(5.91)***

Post-CDS
0.0195
(8.98)**
0.0208
(8.55)**
−0.0013
(−0.42)

Penal C: Regression Analysis—PEAD
Dep. Variable=

POSTRET
(1)

POSTRET
(2)

TopTertileSUE

0.0223
(9.36)***

0.0222
(9.37)***
0.0133
(4.25)***

Yes
Yes
262,457
0.041

Yes
Yes
262,457
0.041

CDS_FIRM
CDS_TRADE

POSTRET
(3)
0.0222
(9.36)***
0.0182
(4.08)***
−0.0107
(−1.94)*

TopTertileSUE × CDS_TRADE
Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
R-squared

Yes
Yes
262,457
0.041

POSTRET
(4)
0.0228
(13.09)***
0.0182
(7.40)***
−0.0020
(−0.42)
−0.0168
(−4.90)***
Yes
Yes
262,457
0.041

This table reports the effect of CDS trading upon earnings quality. The sample consists of 94,203 non-CDS firm-years and 13,252 CDS firmyears (6,585 firm-years for pre–CDS initiation and 6,667 firm-years for post–CDS initiation). Panel A shows a multivariate analysis on earnings
quality of pre–CDS initiation and post–CDS initiation and between CDS firms and non-CDS firms. Panels B and C report the effect of CDS
trading upon post–earnings announcement drift (PEAD). We split the sample into tertiles by SUE and calculate the difference in POSTRET.
TopTertileSUE is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if firm-quarter is for the top tertile of SUE and zero otherwise. All other variables
are defined in The Appendix. Year and industry fixed effects are included. t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by year and
industry are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, two-tailed in control
variables and one-tailed when discussing the results of hypothesis tests with predicted signs of coefficient estimates.
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TABLE 6
Conditioning on Managers’ Earnings Forecast (EF)
Panel A: Board Independence
Dep. Variable =

CDS_TRADE

BD_INDEP
No EF
EF
0.0545
(6.22)***

0.0180
(2.15)**
−0.0365
(−3.16)***

Difference in coefficients on
CDS_TRADE for the two
groups
Firm-level controls
Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
R-squared / pseudo R-squared

Yes
Yes
Yes
11,994
0.188

Yes
Yes
Yes
9,413
0.166

Duality
No EF

EF

−0.2682
(−1.28)

−0.3090
(−1.88)*
−0.0408
(−0.17)

Yes
Yes
Yes
11,994
0.077

Yes
Yes
Yes
9,413
0.087
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Table 6 Continued.
Panel B: Earnings quality
Dep. Variable =

ERC
No EF

CDS_TRADE
Difference in
coefficients on
CDS_TRADE for the
two groups
Firm-level controls
Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
R−squared

RSQ
EF

No EF

DDAQ
EF

No EF

EF

0.0709
0.0220
(3.86)***
(1.49)
−0.0489

0.0156
−0.0162
(2.68)***
(−2.11)**
−0.0318

0.0541
0.0468
(1.68)*
(1.83)*
−0.0073

(−2.77)***

(−5.38)***

(−0.26)

Yes
Yes
Yes
64,814
0.029

Yes
Yes
Yes
18,091
0.012

Yes
Yes
Yes
64,814
0.002

Yes
Yes
Yes
18,091
0.003

Yes
Yes
Yes
44,349
0.166

Yes
Yes
Yes
15,022
0.344

ABVOL
No EF
EF
0.3891
(4.02)***

−0.1722
(−1.04)
0.5613

(3.07)***
Yes
Yes
Yes
15,442
0.232

Yes
Yes
Yes
3,067
0.269

This table reports the effect of CDS trading upon board independence and earnings attributes, after dividing the sample into those do (EF) and do
not (No EF) provide earnings forecasts. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Year and industry fixed effects are included. t-statistics based
on robust standard errors clustered by year and industry are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level,
respectively, two-tailed in control variables and one-tailed when discussing the results of hypothesis tests with predicted signs of coefficient
estimates.
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TABLE 7
Lender Identity Analysis
Panel A: Board Independence
Dep. Variable =

CDS_TRADE

BD_INDEP
Hedged Risks
Hedged Risks
More Likely
Less Likely
0.0258
(2.18)**

Difference in coefficients on
CDS_TRADE for the two
groups
Firm-level controls
Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
R-squared / pseudo R-squared

0.0045
(0.81)
0.0213

Duality
Hedged Risks
Hedged Risks
More Likely
Less Likely
0.0273
(0.13)

(−0.82)

(1.76)*
Yes
Yes
Yes
5,057
0.265

0.2330
(0.95)
−0.2057

Yes
Yes
Yes
5,339
0.275

Yes
Yes
Yes
5,057
0.138
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Yes
Yes
Yes
5,339
0.084

Table 7 Continued.
Panel B: Earnings quality
Dep. Variable =

CDS_TRADE

ERC
Hedged
Hedged
Risks More Risks Less
Likely
Likely
0.0351
(3.13)***

Difference in
coefficients on
CDS_TRADE for the
two groups
Firm-level controls
Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
R−squared

0.0195
(2.35)**
0.0156

RSQ
Hedged
Hedged
Risks More Risks Less
Likely
Likely
0.0160
(1.83)*

−0.0033
(−0.32)
0.0193

DDAQ
Hedged
Hedged
Risks More Risks Less
Likely
Likely
0.0534
(7.26)***

0.0260
(1.50)*
0.0274

ABVOL
Hedged
Hedged
Risks More Risks Less
Likely
Likely
0.3417
(1.97)*

−0.1000
(−0.61)
0.4417

(1.98)**
(1.83)*
Yes
Yes
Yes
15,097
0.023

Yes
Yes
Yes
14,221
0.054

(1.86)*
Yes
Yes
Yes
15,097
0.005

Yes
Yes
Yes
14,221
0.006

(1.87)*
Yes
Yes
Yes
10,253
0.198

Yes
Yes
Yes
9,421
0.307

Yes
Yes
Yes
2,660
0.312

Yes
Yes
Yes
2,835
0.215

This table reports the effect of credit default swap (CDS) trading upon board independence and earnings quality. We identify lenders to CDS
firms and non-CDS firms in our sample using the Dealscan database, and we collect the risk-weighted net assets on banks’ assets from the Federal
Reserve Y-9C reports. We identify lenders that increased their percentage of total risk-weighted assets in the same year of CDS initiation. We
infer that those lenders likely hedged their risk to the specific borrower through CDS contracts. We categorize the sample into two subgroups:
firm-year observations with lenders that increase risk-weighted net assets and those that decrease risk-weighted net assets. All variables are
defined in the Appendix. Year and industry fixed effects are included. t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by year and industry
are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, two-tailed in control variables and one-tailed
when discussing the results of hypothesis tests with predicted signs of coefficient estimates.
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TABLE 8
Conditioning on default risk
Panel A: Board Independence
Dep. Variable =
Variable

CDS_TRADE

BD_INDEP

BD_INDEP

Lower Default Risk

Higher Default Risk

0.0259
(3.45)***

0.0480
(4.82)***

Duality
Higher Default Risk

-0.3705
(-1.83)*

0.0221

Difference in coefficients on
CDS_TRADE for the two
groups
Firm Level Controls
Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
R-squared / pseudo Rsquared

Duality
Lower Default
Risk

-0.0208
(-0.10)
0.3497

(1.96)**

(1.58)

Yes
Yes
Yes
8,898

Yes
Yes
Yes
8,898

Yes
Yes
Yes
8,898

Yes
Yes
Yes
8,898

0.178

0.194

0.103

0.072
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Panel B: Earnings quality
Dep. Variable =

ERC
Lower
Default Risk

CDS_TRADE

0.0134
(1.01)

Difference in
coefficients on
CDS_TRADE for the
two groups
Firm-level controls
Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
R−squared

RSQ

Higher
Default Risk
0.1086
(3.76)***
0.0952

Lower
Default Risk
0.0094
(1.21)

(3.24)***
Yes
Yes
Yes
43,740
0.011

Yes
Yes
Yes
43,740
0.033

DDAQ

Higher
Default Risk
0.0043
(0.62)
-0.0051

Lower
Default Risk
0.0469
(4.45)***

(-0.54)
Yes
Yes
Yes
43,740
0.002

Yes
Yes
Yes
43,740
0.005

ABVOL

Higher
Default Risk
0.0523
(6.45)***
0.0054

Lower
Default Risk
-0.0904
(-0.78)

(0.45)

Higher
Default Risk
0.3299
(3.08)***
0.4203

(3.22)***

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

29,391
0.391

29,390
0.274

8,362
0.141

8,229
0.263

This table reports the effect of CDS trading upon board independence and earnings attributes, after dividing the sample based on default risk
(modified Z-Score), measured by 1.2 × working capital + 1.4 × retained earnings + 3.3 × EBIT + 0.999 × sales / total assets. All other variables
are defined in the Appendix. Year and industry fixed effects are included. t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by year and industry
are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, two-tailed in control variables and one-tailed
when discussing the results of hypothesis tests with predicted signs of coefficient estimates.
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TABLE 9
Conditioning on the Covenant Intensity
Panel A: Board Independence
Dep. Variable =

CDS_TRADE

BD_INDEP
Fewer Financial
More Financial
Covenants
Covenants
0.0418
(5.22)***

Difference in coefficients on
CDS_TRADE for the two
groups
Firm Level Controls
Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
R-squared / pseudo Rsquared

0.0275
(3.22)***

Duality
Fewer Financial
More Financial
Covenants
Covenants
-0.5057
(-2.19)**

0.1984
(0.75)
−0.7041
(−2.70)***

0.0143
(1.76)*

Yes
Yes
Yes
4,077

Yes
Yes
Yes
2,932

Yes
Yes
Yes
4,077

Yes
Yes
Yes
2,932

0.232

0.221

0.1311

0.0855
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Panel B: Earnings quality
Dep. Variable =

CDS_TRADE

ERC
Fewer
More
Financial
Financial
Covenants
Covenants
0.0410
(3.52)***

0.0228
(7.98)***
0.0182
(2.10)**

Difference in
coefficients on
CDS_TRADE for the
two groups
Firm-level controls
Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
R−squared

Yes
Yes
Yes
11,488
0.021

Yes
Yes
Yes
10,543
0.051

RSQ
Fewer
More
Financial
Financial
Covenants
Covenants
0.0224
(2.67)***

-0.0066
(-0.39)
0.029
(2.91)***

Yes
Yes
Yes
11,488
0.007

Yes
Yes
Yes
10,543
0.008

DDAQ
Fewer
More
Financial
Financial
Covenants
Covenants
0.0409
(4.56)***

0.0230
(2.90)***
0.0179
(2.01)**

Yes
Yes
Yes
9,530
0.237

Yes
Yes
Yes
7,198
0.416

ABVOL
Fewer
More
Financial
Financial
Covenants
Covenants
0.1136
0.2284
(0.44)
(1.54)
−0.1148
(−0.45)

Yes
Yes
Yes
1,917
0.268

Yes
Yes
Yes
1,753
0.270

This table reports the effect of CDS trading upon board independence and earnings attributes, after dividing the sample based on the sample
median of the number of loan financial covenant (Fewer Financial Covenants and More Financial Covenants groups). The information on the
total number of financial covenants included in borrower’s loan package is obtained from Deal Scan database. All variables are defined in the
Appendix. Year and industry fixed effects are included. t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by year and industry are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, two-tailed in control variables and one-tailed when
discussing the results of hypothesis tests with predicted signs of coefficient estimates.
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TABLE 10
Conditioning on Loan Syndication
Panel A: Board Independence
Dep. Variable =
Variable
CDS_TRADE

BD_INDEP
Syndicated

BD_INDEP
Solo Lender

Duality
Syndicated

Duality
Solo Lender

0.0380
(5.36)***

0.0232
(1.27)

-0.2872
(-1.90)*

-1.0481
(-0.71)

Difference in coefficients on
CDS_TRADE for the two groups
Firm Level Controls
Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
R-squared / pseudo R-squared

0.0148
(1.97)**
Yes
Yes
Yes
21,260
0.176

Panel B: Earnings quality
Dep. Variable =

Yes
Yes
Yes
147
0.300

Firm-level controls
Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
R−squared

Solo Lender
-0.0258
(-0.35)
0.0903
(3.23)***

Yes
Yes
Yes
100,515
0.026

Yes
Yes
Yes
138
0.265

RSQ

0.0645
(5.36)***

Difference in coefficients on
CDS_TRADE for the two
groups

Yes
Yes
Yes
21,260
0.087

ERC
Syndicated

CDS_TRADE

0.7609
(0.72)

Yes
Yes
Yes
3,277
0.033

Syndicated

DDAQ

Solo Lender

0.0090
(3.18)***

-0.0264
(-1.17)
0.0354
(2.00)**

Yes
Yes
Yes
100,515
0.002

Yes
Yes
Yes
3,277
0.015
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Syndicated

ABVOL

Solo Lender

0.0441
0.0097
(2.24)**
(0.15)
−0.0344
(−2.14)**

Yes
Yes
Yes
62,274
0.316

Yes
Yes
Yes
2,529
0.260

Syndicated

Solo Lender

0.1929
0.1596
(1.77)*
(1.18)
−0.0333
(−0.51)

Yes
Yes
Yes
17,732
0.244

Yes
Yes
Yes
2,893
0.287

This table reports the effect of CDS trading upon board independence and earnings attributes, conditioning on the existence of the syndicated
loan. The information on the syndicated loan versus sole lender loan is obtained from Deal Scan database. All variables are defined in the
Appendix. Year and industry fixed effects are included. t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by year and industry are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, two-tailed in control variables and one-tailed when
discussing the results of hypothesis tests with predicted signs of coefficient estimates.
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Table 11
Two-Stage Instrumental Variable Approach
Panel A: Board Independence
Variable

First Stage

Second Stage

Second Stage

CDS_TRADE

BD_INDEP

Duality

0.4604
(4.23)***

0.1230
(0.44)

−0.3108
(−4.08)***
0.0013
(0.58)
0.0038
(0.48)
−0.0027
(−1.81)*
0.1151
(3.31)***
0.0019
(0.18)
−0.0199
(−1.44)
−0.1034
(−3.64)***
0.0168
(6.38)***
0.0006
(1.66)*

−0.0563
(−0.28)
0.0444
(7.37)***
−0.0228
(−1.10)
0.0062
(1.60)
−0.5426
(−6.02)***
0.0070
(0.26)
0.0475
(1.32)
−0.1609
(−2.18)**
0.0396
(5.80)***
0.0042
(4.80)***

CDS_TRADE
Industry Peers’ Bond Trading
Volume
Investment Grade/Speculative
Grade Frontier
CDS_FIRM
LNAT
LEV
TOBINQ
RDEXP
CASHSIZE
ROA
HHI
LNAGE
STRETVOL

−0.0356
(−9.78)***
0.3482
(33.12)***
0.8232
(228.34)***
−0.0322
(−17.64)***
−0.0583
(−7.29)***
−0.0057
(−4.01)***
0.0642
(1.96)**
−0.0067
(−0.68)
−0.0309
(−2.26)**
0.0531
(2.30)**
−0.0199
(−8.43)***
−0.0004
(−1.30)

Partial F-statistics
Weak identification test

F = 1504.74 (p < 0.0001)
Cragg−Donald Wald F = 28.20
Stock-Yogo C.V.: 10% Max IV size 16.38
Stock-Yogo C.V.: 15% Max IV size 8.96
Chi2 = 56.51 (p < 0.0001)
Chi2 = 21.27
Chi2 = 0.44
(p < 0.0001)
(p = 0.50)

Under-identification test
Endogeneity test

Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
R-squared / pseudo R-squared

Yes
Yes
20,760
0.878

Yes
Yes
20,760
0.133
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Yes
Yes
20,760
0.104

Table 11 Continued.
Panel B: ERC and RSQ as Dependent Variables
Variable
ERC
CDS_TRADE

RSQ

0.7976
(11.98)***
−0.3724
(−11.25)***
−0.0671
(−33.27)***
0.2481
(10.93)***
−0.0648
(−3.65)***
0.0024
(2.55)**
−0.0730
(−3.79)***
−0.2985
(−5.94)***
−0.2329
(−18.57)***
0.0152
(2.29)**
0.0005
(1.95)*

CDS_FIRM
LNAT
ROA
LEV
MTB
SALESVOL
CFVOL
LOSS%
D_Salesgrowth
ABRET

Partial F-statistics
Weak identification test

Under-identification test
Endogeneity test
Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
R-squared

0.0709
(3.18)***
−0.0349
(−3.15)***
−0.0059
(−8.76)***
0.0101
(1.33)
0.0079
(1.33)
−0.0003
(−0.90)
−0.0062
(−0.95)
0.0012
(0.07)
0.0048
(1.14)
0.0013
(0.60)
−0.0001
(−1.57)

F = 1386.03 (p < 0.0001)
Cragg-Donald Wald F = 3843.47
Stock-Yogo C.V.: 10% Max IV size 16.38
Stock-Yogo C.V.: 15% Max IV size 8.96
Chi2 = 7693.69 (p < 0.0001)
2
Chi = 131.50 (p < 0.0001)
Chi2 = 8.10 (p < 0. 01)
Yes
Yes
103,792
0.009

Yes
Yes
103,792
0.002
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Table 11 Continued.
Panel C: Second-Stage Model, with DDAQ as Dependent Variable
Variable
DDAQ
CDS_TRADE

0.0748
(5.50)***
−0.0276
(−4.72)***
0.0050
(14.62)***
−0.0314
(−8.75)***
−0.0025
(−0.84)
−0.0002
(−0.99)
−0.0323
(−10.37)***
−0.3355
(−40.33)***
−0.0129
(−6.16)***
−0.0030
(−2.73)***
0.0001
(3.48)***

CDS_FIRM
LNAT
ROA
LEV
MTB
SALESVOL
CFVOL
LOSS%
D_Salesgrowth
ABRET

Partial F-statistics
Weak identification test

Under-identification test
Endogeneity test
Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
R-squared

F = 766.53 (p < 0.0001)
Cragg-Donald Wald F = 1808.19
Stock-Yogo C.V.: 10% Max IV size 16.38
Stock-Yogo C.V.: 15% Max IV size 8.96
Chi2 = 3620.82 (p < 0.0001)
Chi2 = 7.12 (p < 0. 01)
Yes
Yes
65,250
0.389
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Table 11 Continued.
Panel D: Second-Stage Model, with ABVOL as Dependent Variable
Variable
ABVOL
CDS_TRADE

0.9564
(3.54)***
−0.3041
(−2.54)**
9.6385
(60.93)***
0.1526
(8.17)***
0.0381
(3.62)***
0.9292
(10.51)***
−0.0468
(−0.64)
−0.0017
(−0.40)
0.0643
(2.22)**

CDS_FIRM
ABSLNRET
LNPRC
LNMKV
ROA
LEV
MTB
D_Salesgrowth

Partial F-statistics
Weak identification test

Under-identification test
Endogeneity test

F = 368.96 (p < 0.0001)
Cragg-Donald Wald F = 872.88
Stock-Yogo C.V.: 10% Max IV size 16.38
Stock-Yogo C.V.: 15% Max IV size 8.96
Chi2 = 1750.76 (p < 0.0001)
Chi2 = 7.19 (p < 0.01)

Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
R-squared

Yes
Yes
18,509
0.240

This table reports results on the effect of credit default swap (CDS) inception upon board independence and
earnings quality using a two-stage least squares approach. Panel A reports results of the first stage with
dependent variable CDS_TRADE and the second stage with dependent variables BD_INDEP and Duality.
Panel B reports results of the second-stage model with dependent variables ERC and RSQ; Panel C, DDAQ;
and Panel D, ABVOL. All variables are defined in the Appendix. t-statistics in parentheses are based on
robust standard errors clustered by industry and year. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively.
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